Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Epistemic NormsNew Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199660025

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660025.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 September 2021

The Unity of Reason

The Unity of Reason

(p.135) 7 The Unity of Reason
Epistemic Norms

Clayton Littlejohn

Oxford University Press

Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm (e.g., a justification or reasonable belief norm) ought to be put in its place. These cases don’t show what they’re intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it’s a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don’t deserve even that.

Keywords:   epistemic norms, practical reason, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemic obligation, excuses, moral responsibility

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .