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Skeptical Theism: New Essays$
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Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661183

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661183.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 September 2021

Two New Versions of Skeptical Theism

Two New Versions of Skeptical Theism

(p.250) 18 Two New Versions of Skeptical Theism
Skeptical Theism: New Essays

Andrew Cullison

Oxford University Press

This chapter defends two new versions of skeptical theism that avoid the “Reasoning About God Problem.” Traditional skeptical theists appeal to an epistemic principle to argue that one cannot infer God would have no justifying reason to permit the horrendous evil one observes, but this threatens to undermine all reasoning about what such a God would do. The first version of skeptical theism defended here offers an alternative principle that is more plausible and avoids the Reasoning About God Problem. The second version of skeptical theism targets the premise that maintains that God would not allow horrendous evil without some justifying reason. Specifically, it argues that one should accept a kind of axiological skepticism that undermines this premise. This yields a substantively different kind of skeptical theism, and it also avoids the Reasoning About God Problem.

Keywords:   problem of evil, skeptical theism, Reasoning About God Problem, horrendous evils, axiological skepticism

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