The Nature of Intuitions
The Nature of Intuitions
The view of the first two parts of the book offers a rationalist epistemology of the a priori that does not afford a central role to intuitions; Part III considers competing rationalist views that do afford intuitions a central role. This preliminary chapter considers some recent denials of epistemic significance to intuitions that proceed on the basis of considerations about the nature of intuitions, such as those by Herman Cappelen, Timothy Williamson, and Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux; these are rejected as too facile. Even if, for instance, intuitions are identified with mere dispositions to believe, this does not preclude their epistemic significance. There is no straightforward argument from considerations about the nature of intuitions to their epistemic insignificance.
Keywords: intuitions, rationalism, the nature of intuitions, epistemology of the a priori, Herman Cappelen, Timothy Williamson
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