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The Rules of Thought$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661800

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 26 September 2021

The Nature of Intuitions

The Nature of Intuitions

(p.260) (p.261) 11 The Nature of Intuitions
The Rules of Thought

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Benjamin W. Jarvis

Oxford University Press

The view of the first two parts of the book offers a rationalist epistemology of the a priori that does not afford a central role to intuitions; Part III considers competing rationalist views that do afford intuitions a central role. This preliminary chapter considers some recent denials of epistemic significance to intuitions that proceed on the basis of considerations about the nature of intuitions, such as those by Herman Cappelen, Timothy Williamson, and Joshua Earlenbaugh and Bernard Molyneux; these are rejected as too facile. Even if, for instance, intuitions are identified with mere dispositions to believe, this does not preclude their epistemic significance. There is no straightforward argument from considerations about the nature of intuitions to their epistemic insignificance.

Keywords:   intuitions, rationalism, the nature of intuitions, epistemology of the a priori, Herman Cappelen, Timothy Williamson

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