Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Rules of Thought$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661800

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 May 2021

Intuition as a Source of Evidence?

Intuition as a Source of Evidence?

(p.301) 13 Intuition as a Source of Evidence?
The Rules of Thought

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Benjamin W. Jarvis

Oxford University Press

This chapter generalizes the principal argument from the previous chapter in order to refute weak experientialist rationalism, the view that intuitions are a source of original, a priori propositional justification. The difference between perceptual experiences—which are a source of original propositional justification—and intuitions is explored and explained. The role that perceptual experience plays in bringing content into the cognitive system is highlighted, and it is argued that this role shows that, in spite of long-standing concerns, it is possible to make sense of the perceptual “given”. The Benacerraf-Field problem for the a priori is considered and a solution is offered.

Keywords:   intuitions, rationalism, perception, perceptual experience, the perceptual given, the Benacerraf-Field problem

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .