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The Rules of Thought$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661800

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 April 2021

A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes

A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes

(p.14) (p.15) 1 A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes
The Rules of Thought

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Benjamin W. Jarvis

Oxford University Press

This chapter outlines a theory of propositional attitudes. On this theory, propositions are individuated by their constituent concepts, which are understood as syntactic terms with semantic values. However, the semantic values in question—Fregean senses—are individuated more finely than the entities in the world that they are about. Propositions inherently and essentially stand in conclusive rational relations that individuate their Fregean senses and the Fregean senses of their constituents. For example, two propositions have the same Fregean sense if and only if they have the same conclusive rational relations. These conclusive rational relations are ones that a thinker must respect as being capable of having attitudes towards propositions. These rational relations are conclusive in the sense that only via rational compromise can defeaters for their rational commitments arise.

Keywords:   propositional attitudes, propositions, concepts, fregean sense, defeaters, rational compromise

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