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The Rules of Thought$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661800

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001

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The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense

The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense

(p.75) 3 The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense
The Rules of Thought

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Benjamin W. Jarvis

Oxford University Press

This chapter addresses Quinean worries about the version of the analytic-synthetic distinction developed in the two previous chapters. Attention is paid to a potential objector who, for the sake of argument, concedes that there are abstract objects that stand in rational (“analytic”) entailment relations, but denies that intentional psychology exhibits the same organization. A theory of content is given that denies the requirement that a subject directly realize these relations via psychologically realized inferential links; instead, the relations depend on the way the links would be realized at the limit, should the subject exercise higher-order abilities to systematize those inferential patterns that are present. The theory has the result that propositional content of mental representations is sometimes indeterminate, particularly where singular terms are involved; but this indeterminacy is not pernicious.

Keywords:   quine, analyticity, theory of content, intentional psychology, singular terms, content indeterminacy

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