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The Rules of Thought$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661800

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 April 2021

Fregean Sense First

Fregean Sense First

(p.132) 5 Fregean Sense First
The Rules of Thought

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Benjamin W. Jarvis

Oxford University Press

This chapter concerns deductive reasoning. It is of note that subjects are not generally rationally permitted to jointly accept propositions that are logically inconsistent. This fact illustrates the rational significance of the logical relations that hold between propositions. This chapter addresses the epistemology of logic by defending a minimalist explanation of this rational significance. Rational significance is a primitive feature of the logical and certain other entailment relations in which propositions stand in. It is argued that alternative explanations in the contemporary literature—including explanations given in terms of concept possession, metasemantics, pragmatism, and evaluationism—are not promising.

Keywords:   deductive reasoning, epistemology of logic, concept possession, metasemantics, pragmatism, evaluationism

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