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The Rules of Thought$
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199661800

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199661800.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 April 2021

A Theory of the A Priori

A Theory of the A Priori

(p.160) (p.161) 6 A Theory of the A Priori
The Rules of Thought

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa

Benjamin W. Jarvis

Oxford University Press

This chapter characterizes the a priori. The characterization relies heavily on the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification; propositional justification is the more fundamental for apriority. Having a belief with a priori doxastic justification is a matter of capitalizing on the existence of a priori propositional justification for that belief, even if this capitalizing intimately involves having experiences. A subject has a priori propositional justification for a belief just in case no experience constitutively explains its propositional justification. In contrast, a posteriori propositional justification is propositional justification that is undergirded by experience. The approach developed is contrasted with an alternative conception of the a priori according to which what matters is not justificatory independence from all experience, but justificatory independence from all but special “intuition” experiences.

Keywords:   a priori, a posteriori, propositional justification, doxastic justification, rationality, experience

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