A Priori Philosophy: Responses to Objections
A Priori Philosophy: Responses to Objections
This chapter addresses three worries about the a priori. The first is that there cannot be a priori philosophical knowledge because philosophical faculties must be authenticated a posteriori. This worry is quelled by appreciating the distinction between first-order knowledge and second-order knowledge of one's rational abilities. The second is that, to the extent that philosophical inquiry draws on the same rational abilities at work in a posteriori quotidian inquiry—including perceptual abilities to “peek”—the former cannot yield a priori knowledge. It is pointed out in response that apriority is not directly a matter of the kind of abilities exercised. The final worry concerns whether a priori knowledge is threatened by skeptical scenarios in which one is intellectually attracted to false propositions as if they were a priori truths; it is argued that these scenarios are not threatening, because apriority does not hinge on intellectual attraction.
Keywords: a priori, a posteriori, peeking, philosophical inquiry, objections to the a priori
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