Why Equality?
Why Equality?
Should egalitarians be concerned with equalizing some individual material good, or should they rather settle on equalizing a certain relationship between individuals? This chapter defends the former answer. It does by invoking the mechanism of second-person justification to show that we owe justification to any advantage, no matter how minute, that we may have. The conclusion is rather surprising because it is normally relational, rather than luck, egalitarianism that is considered to embody ‘the second-person perspective’. The chapter concludes that distributive justice considers all individuals disadvantages as morally suspect.
Keywords: Disadvantage, justification, relational egalitarianism, envy
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