Essays in Collective Epistemology
Jennifer Lackey
Abstract
This book examines new philosophical work on issues in collective epistemology. Questions discussed include: Should the justified beliefs and knowledge of collective entities be understood simply in terms of the justified beliefs and knowledge of their individual members? Or are these epistemic phenomena somehow over and above those of the group’s members? How should we understand group testimony as a source of knowledge? How do we tell if a group is an agent, epistemic or otherwise? Can epistemic virtues apply to groups? Is disagreement between groups subject to the same epistemic principles ... More
This book examines new philosophical work on issues in collective epistemology. Questions discussed include: Should the justified beliefs and knowledge of collective entities be understood simply in terms of the justified beliefs and knowledge of their individual members? Or are these epistemic phenomena somehow over and above those of the group’s members? How should we understand group testimony as a source of knowledge? How do we tell if a group is an agent, epistemic or otherwise? Can epistemic virtues apply to groups? Is disagreement between groups subject to the same epistemic principles governing disagreement between individuals? How far does the social extend into individual epistemology? Do theories and distinctions accepted in individual epistemology apply straightforwardly to the corresponding phenomena in the collective domain? What is the coherence requirement for individual and group judgment? When is it rational to defer to supermajority testimony?
Keywords:
collective epistemology,
groups,
knowledge,
justified belief,
testimony,
agent,
disagreement,
coherence
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2014 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780199665792 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2015 |
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.001.0001 |
