Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Challenges to Moral and Religious BeliefDisagreement and Evolution$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199669776

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 01 October 2020

Normative Disagreement as a Challenge to Moral Philosophy and Philosophical Theology

Normative Disagreement as a Challenge to Moral Philosophy and Philosophical Theology

(p.61) 3 Normative Disagreement as a Challenge to Moral Philosophy and Philosophical Theology
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief

Robert Audi

Oxford University Press

This chapter has three main aims: first, to distinguish between different kinds and degrees of moral disagreement, particularly between disagreements in reasons and disagreements on reasons; second, to show how, in both moral and non-moral disputes, rational disagreement is possible even on self-evident propositions; and third, to sketch a conception of disagreement between rational parties that bears on the problem of religious diversity as a challenge to philosophical theology. Disagreement in moral matters has long been considered a challenge to objectivist ethical theories, and the difficulty of resolving such disagreement appears to support skepticism about the possibility of knowledge, and even of justification, regarding religious beliefs, religious faith, and religious conduct. The chapter explores rational disagreements of many kinds and concludes with an assessment of how, given what we learn from examining them, objectivity can be plausibly claimed in normative matters.

Keywords:   disagreement, divine command theory, epistemic parity, faith and reason, justification, obligation, rationality, reasons, self-evidence

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .