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The Criminalization of European Cartel EnforcementTheoretical, Legal, and Practical Challenges$
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Peter Whelan

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199670062

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199670062.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 October 2021

European Antitrust Criminalization and the Third Challenge of Design

European Antitrust Criminalization and the Third Challenge of Design

Identifying the Desirable Enforcement Strategies

Chapter:
(p.260) 10 European Antitrust Criminalization and the Third Challenge of Design
Source:
The Criminalization of European Cartel Enforcement
Author(s):

Peter Whelan

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199670062.003.0010

This chapter analyses important enforcement strategies that render the criminal cartel regime effective in practice. It explains that serious criminal antitrust officials need to understand (and avoid) the so-called ‘compliance trap’ when they rely upon ‘moral leveraging’ to enforce the criminal cartel offence, as well as the importance of creating and fostering political and public support for the criminal cartel regime. It examines the strategic issue of ensuring sufficient support from important stakeholders, and the institutional design of a criminal cartel regime. Specifically, it examines the strategic issue of which entity/entities should exercise the investigative and/or prosecutorial functions in such a regime. It also explores the concept of international cooperation, in particular: its importance for those criminalized regimes that are serious about tackling the most harmful cartels; the difficulties engendered in this context by criminal antitrust enforcement; and strategies that can be adopted to overcome these difficulties.

Keywords:   compliance trap, extradition, institutional design, international cooperation, judicial support, juries, public support, sentencing guidelines

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