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Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue$
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Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O'Connor

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199672158

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672158.001.0001

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Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others—An Argument from Analogy?

Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others—An Argument from Analogy?

(p.174) 8 Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others—An Argument from Analogy?
Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue

Elizabeth Fricker

Oxford University Press

Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one’s own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted and under which circumstances—there is no rational presumption of the trustworthiness of others. Hence, insofar as one’s religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others, rationality requires that one assess the credentials of those whom one trusts.

Keywords:   Foley, trust, rationality, testimony

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