Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Limits of Realism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tim Button

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199672172

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672172.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 January 2022

Sceptical veils of various fabrics

Sceptical veils of various fabrics

(p.46) 6 Sceptical veils of various fabrics
The Limits of Realism

Tim Button

Oxford University Press

Chapter 5 raised problems for external realists who accepted a bracketed empiricist theory of empirical content. Many external realists do, indeed, accept such a theory of empirical content. But in fact, no matter how the external realist explains her Cartesianism Principle, similar problems arise. In addition to the veil of sensations, it is possible to consider: a veil of Fregean senses that prevents access to ordinary objects; a veil of phenomena that prevents access to the noumena; a veil of observables that prevents access to unobservables; and a veil of flux that prevents access to the Forms. All external realists must accept that, by their own lights, any statement with empirical content is just more theory and so fails to constrain reference.

Keywords:   bracketed experience, cartesianism principle, empirical content, veil of sensations, veil of senses, veil of phenomena, veil of observables, veil of flux, just-more-theory manoeuvre, external realism, putnam’s model-theoretic arguments

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .