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Chance and Temporal Asymmetry$
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Alastair Wilson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199673421

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001

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Time, Chance, and the Necessity of Everything

Time, Chance, and the Necessity of Everything

(p.280) 14Time, Chance, and the Necessity of Everything
Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Alexander Bird

Oxford University Press

There is no contingency in the world. This chapter shows how premises that all have some plausibility in metaphysics and physics lead to this conclusion, that every true proposition is necessarily true (e.g. the proposition that there is thought). The argument turns on the necessity of laws of nature, the claim that there is no absolute distinction between laws and initial conditions, and the Everett–De Witt ‘many worlds’ hypothesis.

Keywords:   contingency, necessitarianism, laws of nature, no-boundary condition, many worlds

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