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Chance and Temporal Asymmetry$
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Alastair Wilson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199673421

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 26 January 2022

Proving the Principal Principle

Proving the Principal Principle

(p.81) 4 Proving the Principal Principle
Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

Wolfgang Schwarz

Oxford University Press

Any credible interpretation of objective chance should make sense of the connection between objective chance and rational degree of belief. Ideally, an account that identifies chance with some objective quantity X should be accompanied by a story that explains, from independently plausible assumptions, why X guides rational credence in the way captured by the Principal Principle. In this chapter, this story is provided for various Humean accounts of chance, including frequentist and Best Systems accounts. Along the way, a generalization of the Principal Principle that allows for dyadic and ‘indefinite’ chances is suggested.

Keywords:   chance, credence, Principal Principle, best systems, frequentism

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