True Belief as a Non-Ideal Good
True Belief as a Non-Ideal Good
It is argued that true belief is only sometimes pro tanto valuable vis-à-vis the wellbeing of the believer. First, cases of useless true belief are considered. Second, cases of uninteresting and insignificant true belief are considered. Third, the social value of true belief is discussed, and it is argued that true belief is only sometimes socially valuable. Finally, the idea that true belief is necessary for wellbeing is criticized.
Keywords: Utility, trivial truths, significance, wellbeing, value, truth
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