The Problem of the Source of Epistemic Normativity
The Problem of the Source of Epistemic Normativity
The “problem of the source of epistemic normativity,” which is the problem of explaining the appropriateness of epistemic evaluation and epistemic reasons attribution, is introduced. Accounts of epistemic value in terms of wellbeing and social value are rejected, and an alternative type of account, “epistemic essentialism,” is introduced. The meaning of “epistemic” is discussed. On naturalistic grounds, it is argued that positing irreducible normativity should be avoided.
Keywords: Epistemic normativity, epistemic value, epistemic reasons, essentialism, naturalism, normativity
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