Humean Approaches
Humean Approaches
“Humean” approaches to epistemic normativity, which explain epistemic normativity as a species of instrumental normativity, are articulated and criticized. A “teleological” conception of belief, on which belief requires a desire to believe nothing but the truth, is considered. It is argued that belief is not normally accompanied by the desires required by the Humean’s account. Objections, in defense of Humean approaches, are considered.
Keywords: Instrumental value, epistemic value, epistemic reasons, instrumental reasons, teleological conception of belief
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