Kantian Approaches
Kantian Approaches
“Kantian” approaches to epistemic normativity, on which truth is belief’s constitutive standard of correctness (regardless of the desires of the believer), are articulated and criticized. A “normative” conception of belief is considered. It is argued that Kantian approaches are in tension with philosophical naturalism. More importantly, it is argued, the main argument for the Kantian’s view is unsound: the reality of the phenomena suggestive of the Kantian’s view (e.g. doxastic involuntarism) is contingent, and not necessary. Other arguments for the Kantian’s view are also criticized.
Keywords: Standard of correctness, naturalism, doxastic involuntarism, epistemic reasons, normative conception of belief
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