Anti-Realism about Epistemic Normativity
Anti-Realism about Epistemic Normativity
“Anti-realism” about epistemic normativity is articulated and defended against objections. First, a socio-epistemological vindication of the practice of epistemic evaluation is advanced. Second, three accounts of the semantics of epistemic evaluation (error theory, expressivism, and “convention-relativism”) are sympathetically discussed. Epistemic evaluation is favorably compared to evaluation relative to the rules of a club and to rules of etiquette. Finally, a definition of “epistemic” is provided, and “pluralism about doxastic evaluation” is proposed.
Keywords: Anti-realism, epistemic value, error theory, expressivism, pluralism
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