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Reason, Morality, and LawThe Philosophy of John Finnis$
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John Keown and Robert P. George

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199675500

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.001.0001

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The Basis for Being a Subject of Rights

The Basis for Being a Subject of Rights

the Natural Law Position

Chapter:
(p.236) 15 The Basis for Being a Subject of Rights
Source:
Reason, Morality, and Law
Author(s):

Patrick Lee

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.003.0016

What is the basis of full moral worth? On what basis are some entities bearers of fundamental rights while other entities are not? This chapter defends the position that this basis is being a substance with a rational nature. It defends both parts of this criterion, namely, that it is a type of substance — not an accidental attribute — and it is a substance that has a rational nature.

Keywords:   substance, rational nature, natural capacity, developed capacity, practical principles

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