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Reason, Morality, and LawThe Philosophy of John Finnis$
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John Keown and Robert P. George

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199675500

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.001.0001

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Value, Practice, and Idea

Value, Practice, and Idea

(p.310) (p.311) 19 Value, Practice, and Idea
Reason, Morality, and Law

N.E. Simmonds

Oxford University Press

The relationship between social institutions and the domain of reason and value is poorly understood. One part of the problem springs from a tendency to think of values as radically independent of social practice, rather than acknowledging the extent to which they must be found within our forms of association. The practices of law are not attempts to realize values that can be conceived of independently of the practices in question: rather, the values are expressed within the practices. Legal positivists have attempted to capture the close association between law and value by arguments concerning law's ‘claims’ or law's ‘aims’, but such endeavours are unsuccessful.

Keywords:   practice, value, law, morality, rule of law, common good

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