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Reason, Morality, and LawThe Philosophy of John Finnis$
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John Keown and Robert P. George

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199675500

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 November 2020

Intention and the Allocation of Risk

Intention and the Allocation of Risk

Chapter:
(p.413) 25 Intention and the Allocation of Risk
Source:
Reason, Morality, and Law
Author(s):

Neil M. Gorsuch

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.003.0026

In this chapter, originally delivered as a speech, Judge Neil Gorsuch discusses Finnis' gifts and generosity as a teacher before turning to examine his contributions to our understanding of the legal concept of intent. In crime and tort, liability has often and traditionally depended on showing that the defendant intended to commit a legal wrong. Various theorists, however, have criticized this reliance on intent. Citing Finnis' work, Judge Gorsuch highlights some of the flaws of their criticism and defends the analytical and normative significance of intent. Analytically, Gorsuch argues, there is a difference between intending a consequence and hoping for or foreseeing a consequence. Normatively, he explains, our intentional choices shape who we are and reflect how we think of others.

Keywords:   Finnis, intent, intentional crimes, intentional torts, mens rea, Bird v Holbrook, Richard Posner, Glanville Williams

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