Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Reason, Morality, and LawThe Philosophy of John Finnis$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

John Keown and Robert P. George

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199675500

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 January 2021

Intention and Side Effects

Intention and Side Effects

John Finnis and Elizabeth Anscombe*

(p.92) (p.93) 6 Intention and Side Effects
Reason, Morality, and Law

Gormally Luke

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that John Finnis is mistaken in thinking that his understanding of the scope of intention has been faithful to the conception of intentional action developed in Elizabeth Anscombe's monograph Intention; and that Anscombe herself, in later ethical analyses, effectively abandoned her original conception of intentional action. The argument focuses on two types of case: craniotomy and the stuck potholer. It contends that it is Finnis not Anscombe who has overlooked the lessons of Intention for the evaluation of the cases in treating as side effects what she treats as intended. Finnis employs an unduly narrow conception of the scope of intention. Fidelity to Anscombe's conception would, however, raise difficulties for his ethical theory.

Keywords:   act analysis, Elizabeth Anscombe, craniotomy, immediate effects, practical knowledge, intention, scope, truthfulness, declarations, John Finnis

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .