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Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law$
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Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199675517

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675517.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 11 August 2020

In Defense of Hart

In Defense of Hart

(p.22) 2 In Defense of Hart
Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law

Matthew H. Kramer

Oxford University Press

In his book Legality, Scott Shapiro seeks to provide the motivation for the development of his own elaborate account of law by undertaking a critique of H. L. A. Hart's jurisprudential theory. Shapiro argues that Hart's understanding of the Rule of Recognition is confused and that his model of law — though commendably more sophisticated than the model propounded by earlier legal positivists — is therefore untenable. Because of what Shapiro takes to be the unsustainability of Hart's exposition of the nature of law, he believes that a new approach is vital for progress in the philosophy of law. With his presentation of his own Planning Theory of Law, he aspires to elaborate just such an approach. This chapter does not directly assess the strengths and shortcomings of Shapiro's Planning Theory. Instead, it defends Hart against Shapiro's charges and thereby undermines the motivation for the development of the Planning Theory.

Keywords:   H. L. A. Hart, Scott Shapiro, legal positivism, Rule of Recognition, law, morality

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