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Cosmopolitanism versus Non-CosmopolitanismCritiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations$
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Gillian Brock

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199678426

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678426.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 October 2021

On the Relation Between Moral and Distributive Equality

On the Relation Between Moral and Distributive Equality

(p.55) 3 On the Relation Between Moral and Distributive Equality
Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism

Andrea Sangiovanni

Oxford University Press

This chapter addresses, and rejects, two arguments for the conclusion that duties of distributive justice have non-relational grounds and global scope. The first argument holds that, because our place of birth is a product of chance rather than choice, we ought to reject any argument that purports to narrow the scope and grounds of distributive equality to a group smaller than all of humanity. The second argument holds that our commitment to the idea of moral equality establishes a presumption in favour of a globally egalitarian baseline, from which departures can only be justified by some relevant exercise of agency or choice. The chapter also explores the grounds and nature of our commitment to moral equality more generally.

Keywords:   cosmopolitanism, moral equality, global justice, moral arbitrariness, distributive justice, egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism

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