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Impassioned Belief$
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Michael Ridge

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199682669

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.001.0001

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Ecumenical Cognitivism

Ecumenical Cognitivism

(p.77) 3 Ecumenical Cognitivism
Impassioned Belief

Michael Ridge

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins by defining ‘Ecumenical Cognitivism’ and situating it in a broader taxonomy. It then distinguishes two importantly different species of Ecumenical Cognitivism and argues that none of these views are ultimately defensible, though some are more promising than others. It concludes that even the most promising forms of Ecumenical Cognitivism cannot preserve the right links between attributions of normative truth (and falsity) and talk of normative agreement (and disagreement).

Keywords:   normative truth, normative agreement, ecumenical cognitivism, falsity

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