This chapter examines the concept of normative truth. It first addresses a recurring worry about quasi-realist forms of expressivism — namely, that any such theory must collapse into a crude subjectivism. It briefly discusses the standard quasi-realist appeal to deflationism and how it gives worrying hostages to fortune. This, in turn, motivates an alternative strategy for accommodating truth-aptness. To that end, it is argued that Ecumenical Expressivism can accommodate literal talk of normative truth without presupposing deflationism or indeed any other particular conception of the underlying nature of truth. Rather, any otherwise plausible theory of truth can be modified in a principled way so as to be combined smoothly with Ecumenical Expressivism. Even as realist-sounding a theory as the correspondence theory of truth can be accommodated, given this strategy. The chapter concludes by discussing some of the main advantages of this approach and two of the most important objections it faces.
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