Moral Technology and the Concept of ‘the Self’
The author argues that, in “Autonomy and the ethics of biological behaviour modification”, Savulescu, Douglas, and Persson are discussing the ethics of a technology for improving moral motivation and behaviour that does not yet exist and will most likely never exist. While they succeed in showing how behavioural modification might be compatible with freedom and autonomy – and perhaps even justifiable even if it were not — in the fantastic case they consider, there is little one can conclude from this about any technology of “moral bioenhancement” in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there is a real danger that their argument will license attempts to manipulate behaviour through drugs and brain implants, which raise profound moral issues that they barely mention.
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