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Doing and Allowing Harm$
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Fiona Woollard

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780199683642

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199683642.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 September 2021

Counterexamples and Objections

Counterexamples and Objections

(p.80) 5 Counterexamples and Objections
Doing and Allowing Harm

Fiona Woollard

Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on various counterexamples and objections to the analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing. A typical gun fires through the removal of a barrier (the sear) which has been holding back a coiled spring. The author’s account may thus seem to misclassify firing a gun as merely allowing harm. The author shows that it does not. She also discusses the objection that the account illegitimately appeals to normative or conventional facts, and objections based on the role of intuition in the arguments. The author argues that neither of these objections undermines her account.

Keywords:   distinction between doing and allowing, firing a gun, normative facts, the role of intuition

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