Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Social Insurance, Informality, and Labor MarketsHow to Protect Workers While Creating Good Jobs$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Markus Frölich, David Kaplan, Carmen Pagés, Jamele Rigolini, and David Robalino

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199685233

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685233.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 November 2021

The Design of a Multi‐Tier Contributory Pension System

The Design of a Multi‐Tier Contributory Pension System

The Distributional Impact of the 2008 Chilean Pension Reform*

Chapter:
(p.291) 10 The Design of a Multi‐Tier Contributory Pension System
Source:
Social Insurance, Informality, and Labor Markets
Author(s):

Orazio Attanasio

Costas Meghir

Andres Otero

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685233.003.0010

Defined contributions pension schemes tends to replicate inequalities observed in the labor market. As final pensions depend primarily on the total accumulated pension wealth during the working lifetime, individuals with poorer earning and lower labor market attachment will finish with low pensions. Moreover, if a sizeable fraction of the population participates into the informal labor market, inequality in pensions can be even higher, if contributions to formal schemes have tax advantages. During 2008, a major pension reform was implemented in Chile to reduce pensions inequalities and to prevent old-age poverty, guaranteeing a minimum and stable level of consumption upon retirement. At the same time the reform attempted to reduce incentives to participate into the informal sector. The first tier of the system was modified introducing a non-contributory flat minimum pension and a decreasing pension subsidy. Several other elements were implemented such as a child pension subsidy, compensation upon divorce, gender dependent disability insurance premium and male survivor pensions, recognizing structural inequalities of the system. This chapter computes the distributional effects on the final total accumulated pension wealth and pensions due to the reform. The reform has increased not only the self-financed pension wealth, due to the different mechanisms or subsidies received during the accumulation period, but also has importantly improved the final pension due to the first tier reform. For those workers retiring before 2015, the self-financed pension wealth and the final pension will increase in average 0.6% and 15%, respectively. Even though the final pension changes have been positive for both genders, the female pension improvement has been 56% higher than the rise for men, reducing the gender inequalities significantly.

Keywords:   pension system, inequality, social insurance, Chile, pension wealth, gender

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .