Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 3$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Mark Timmons

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199685905

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 07 July 2022

On Criminal and Moral Responsibility

On Criminal and Moral Responsibility

Chapter:
(p.154) 7 On Criminal and Moral Responsibility
Source:
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 3
Author(s):

David Shoemaker

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.003.0008

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the underexplored relation between criminal and moral responsibility. Most Anglo-American legal and moral theorists simply assume the two related tenets that together make up the so-called Standard View. The first tenet is that moral responsibility is a necessary condition of criminal responsibility normatively understood, that for one to be genuinely or legitimately criminally responsible for X, one must be morally responsible for X. The second tenet is that essential elements of CR are structural and functional analogues of essential elements of MR, e.g., desert, justification, excuses, and the relevance of motivations. This chapter shows why both tenets of the Standard View are false, or at least quite misleading. The chapter begins by distinguishing three conceptions of responsibility — attributability, answerability, and accountability — and then proceeds to show how each of these three conceptions involves importantly different structural features in each of the criminal and moral realms.

Keywords:   accountability, answerability, Antony Duff, attributability, criminal responsibility, moral responsibility, motivating reasons, motives, normative reasons, strict liability

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .