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Surpassing the Sovereign StateThe Wealth, Self-Rule, and Security Advantages of Partially Independent Territories$
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David A. Rezvani

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199688494

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688494.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 25 January 2022

Partial Independence Advantages and Evolution

Partial Independence Advantages and Evolution

Chapter:
(p.40) 2 Partial Independence Advantages and Evolution
Source:
Surpassing the Sovereign State
Author(s):

David A. Rezvani

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688494.003.0002

Chapter 2 lays out the principal reasons for the advantages and evolution of partially independent territories (PITs). PITs often benefit from high degrees of nationalistic compromise, core state public goods, and credible commitments that their fully independent counterparts do not enjoy. They not only emerge because of these advantages, but also because they are initially seen by core states as an institutional response for preventing catastrophes such as state fragmentation, war, and/or economic disaster. In time the sense of self-interest and fear that tends to launch partially independent unions often gives way to mutual trust that is bolstered by core state norms of shared identity and PIT perceptions of fairness. PIT secession will, however, become an increasing possibility if this mutual trust—especially the trust that is underpinned by PIT perceptions of fairness—becomes weakened.

Keywords:   punctuated equilibrium, catastrophe, public goods, nationalistic compromise, credible commitments, marriage analogy, integrationist theory, self-regarding norms, other-regarding norms

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