Certain basic notions are introduced, e.g. normative interest, normative power, deontic value. Three different ways in which obligation can be choice-dependent are distinguished. Various key claims to be discussed in the book are enunciated, both claims to be rejected (like the Rationalist claim that only reasons can make sense of intentional action) and claims to be defended (like the claim that the possibility of normative powers depends on our possession of normative interests, or the claim that deontic phenomena can have value for their own sake). The structure of the book is outlined and the logical geography of some central notions — e.g. wrong, wronging, and obligation — is diagrammed.
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