The Mere Means Principle
The Mere Means Principle
This chapter develops an account of treating another as a means, that is, using another, which is a kind of action that is often morally permissible. Treating another merely as a means (or just using another) is typically wrong, the chapter argues, in contrast to Derek Parfit’s position. Inspired by Kant, one might hold that an agent treats another merely as a means if the other cannot share the end she is pursuing in using him or, instead, if he is unable to consent to her using him. One might interpret this inability to consent in terms of it being irrational to consent or, rather, in terms of the lack of an opportunity to consent. The chapter rejects these views individually but tries to combine elements of some of them into a plausible sufficient condition for an agent’s treating another merely as a means, namely the Hybrid Account.
Keywords: consent, end sharing, just using, kant, means, mere means, parfit, rational consent, using
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