Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Mark Timmons

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199693269

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 January 2022

In defense of consequentializing 1

In defense of consequentializing 1

(p.97) 5 In defense of consequentializing1
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1

Jamie Dreier

Oxford University Press

According to common wisdom in moral theory, some moral views are consequentialist and some are not. Since ‘consequentialism’ is a term of art, there is no correct way to define it, but this paper assumes that a view is consequentialist iff the deontic status it assigns an act is an increasing function of the goodness it assigns the consequences. The main point of the paper is to defend an equivalence thesis: each plausible moral view has a consequentialist equivalent. The paper is in effect a defense of an equivalence thesis against some recent objections. The thesis has two parts: Extensional Equivalence says that each plausible moral view has a consequentialist counterpart that agrees with it on the deontic status of every act; Extensionality says that nothing but extension matters in a moral view. Together these entail that every plausible moral view is a mere notational variant of a consequentialist view.

Keywords:   consequentialist, consequentializing, teleology, deontology

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .