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From Normativity to Responsibility$
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Joseph Raz

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199693818

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 January 2022

Reasons: Practical and Adaptive

Reasons: Practical and Adaptive

Chapter:
(p.36) 3 Reasons: Practical and Adaptive
Source:
From Normativity to Responsibility
Author(s):

Joseph Raz

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0003

Introducing a distinction between standard and non-standard reasons, based on the ability to directly follow them, the chapter uses it to solve the ‘right kind of reason’ and the Toxin Puzzle, and to explain the difference between practical reasons and adaptive reasons, of which epistemic reasons are an instance. It then argues that normativity cannot be explained by its relationship to value because epistemic reasons are not related to value at all.

Keywords:   standard reasons, adaptive reasons, epistemic reasons, practical reasons, evidence, following reasons, conforming with reasons, value, value of truth, value of knowledge, reasons for emotions

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