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From Normativity to Responsibility$
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Joseph Raz

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199693818

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.001.0001

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On the Guise of the Good

On the Guise of the Good

(p.59) 4 On the Guise of the Good
From Normativity to Responsibility

Joseph Raz

Oxford University Press

The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that establish that the action has some value; and that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An examination of the nature of intentions and intentional actions leads to successive modification of the theses, concluding with a new position, a recognizable variant of the Guise of the Good Thesis, and true to its ambition of being a key to the explanation of intentions, and of actions for intentions.

Keywords:   Guise of the Good, intention, independent intention, embedded intention, expressive action

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