Ryle on Knowing How
Ryle on Knowing How
Gilbert Ryle is well known for arguing that knowing how is not a kind of knowing that. The purpose of this chapter is to distinguish Ryle’s correct insights about action from his incorrect conclusions about the relation between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the case. Ryle provides several different regress arguments to show that knowing how is not a kind of knowing that. Various versions of Ryle’s regress arguments are discussed, including his version of the Lewis Carroll argument. The morals of the discussion are applied a number of recent discussions in ethics and the philosophy of mind about what it is to act intelligently and what it is to act for a reason.
Keywords: Gilbert Ryle, skill, Hubert Dreyfus, acting on a reason, regress, Lewis Carroll
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