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Know How$
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Jason Stanley

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199695362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.001.0001

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Knowledge Justified

Knowledge Justified

(p.175) 8 Knowledge Justified
Know How

Jason Stanley

Oxford University Press

Knowledge is a standard more demanding than justified true belief. In section 1, the more demanding standard is justified in the face of apparent Gettier-style counterexamples. The second section returns to the case of expert performance. One might worry that if knowing how to do something is a kind of propositional knowledge, it should take the form of codified maxims that provide clear instructions for action in every situation. But expert knowledge how often requires adjusting appropriately to novel situations, ones not covered by previously codified instructions. The third section explains the role knowledge how has in explaining knowledge of action, and in particular how we know without observation what we are doing.

Keywords:   Gettier-cases, knowledge, expertise, action, knowledge without observation, G.E. Anscombe

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