The highly general notion of structure lets us raise metaphysical questions about logic. Is it conjunction or disjunction that is most fundamental? (An uncomfortable question! ‐ fortunately we may answer “both”; the joint‐carving notions can contain some redundancy.) Do logical notions carve at the joints? (Surely yes, since they are indispensable in fundamental theories.) Do metalogical notions ‐ such as logical truth and logical consequence ‐ carve at the joints? (Probably not; unlike logical notions they are not needed in fundamental theories.) Is logic classical? (At the fundamental level, yes; but in nonfundamental languages perhaps we should say not, because of vagueness and the liar paradox.)
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.