One rival account of fundamentality is based on Kit Fine’s notions of ground and reality. But ground violates purity (if it is taken to be fundamental); and the reality‐based account is holistic in an unexplanatory way. Another rival account is based on truthmaking. But truthmaking is an unsatisfactory foundation for a theory of fundamentality since objects are truthmakers and objects are too coarse‐grained a foundation for metaphysical explanation. A final rival is based on Jonathan Schaffer’s notion of entity‐grounding. But again, entities are too coarse‐grained a foundation for metaphysical explanation. Friends of grounding and truthmaking can introduce distinctive entities ‐ states of affairs ‐ that are fine‐grained enough to explain, but at the cost of positing further fundamental facts.
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