This book presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. It develops a treatment of the metaphysics of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded either as constructs from mental events, or as fundamentally embodied, or as Cartesian egos. A theory of the first person concept, which integrates with the positive treatment of subjects, is developed, a theory that contributes to the explanation of various distinctive first person phenomena in the th ... More

This book presents a philosophical theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory the nature of first person representation of such a subject of consciousness. It develops a treatment of the metaphysics of subjects, distinct from previous theories, under which subjects were regarded either as constructs from mental events, or as fundamentally embodied, or as Cartesian egos. A theory of the first person concept, which integrates with the positive treatment of subjects, is developed, a theory that contributes to the explanation of various distinctive first person phenomena in the theory of thought and knowledge. The positive account is brought to bear on the contributions to these issues made by Descartes, Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Strawson. The book also addresses more recent literature in the philosophy of mind on immunity to error through misidentification. The later parts of the book distinguish and characterize three varieties of self-consciousness. Perspectival self-consciousness involves the subject’s capacity to appreciate that she is of the same kind as things given in a third personal way, and attributes the subject to a certain kind of objective thought about herself. Reflective self-consciousness involves awareness of the subject’s own mental states, reached in a distinctive way. Interpersonal self-consciousness is awareness that one features, as a subject, in some other person’s mental states. These varieties, and the relations and the forms of co-operation between them, are important in explaining features of our knowledge, our social relations, and our emotional lives.