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The Metaphysics of Gender$
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Charlotte Witt

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199740413

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740413.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 09 May 2021

Human Organisms, Social Individuals, and Persons

Human Organisms, Social Individuals, and Persons

Chapter:
3 (p.51) Human Organisms, Social Individuals, and Persons
Source:
The Metaphysics of Gender
Author(s):

Charlotte Witt

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199740413.003.0003

This chapter distinguishes between human organisms, social individuals, and persons. It argues that the claim of gender essentialism is best formulated as a claim about social individuals rather than about persons or about human organisms.

Keywords:   humans, social individuals, persons, gender essentialism

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