The Experiential Origins of Intentionality
The Experiential Origins of Intentionality
The purpose of the present chapter is to argue that the intentionality proper to our conscious experience—“experiential intentionality”—deserves a central theoretical role in our account of intentionality. It is argued that our conception of intentionality is grounded in our grasp of experiential intentionality, and that to that extent, experiential intentionality is the origin of all intentionality. I call this the thesis of the experiential origins of intentionality, or the experiential origin thesis for short. Section 1.1 presents a general model of how we form our conceptions of certain phenomena, including the phenomenon of intentionality. Section 1.2 presents an argument to the effect that the application of the general model to the case of intentionality generates the result that our conception of intentionality is grounded in our grasp of experiential intentionality. Sections 1.3 offers some elucidations of the central notion of experiential intentionality.
Keywords: experiential intentionality, concept formation, anchoring instances, principle of charity
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