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The Sources of Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199742974

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 28 June 2022

The Nature of Experiential Intentionality

The Nature of Experiential Intentionality

II. An Adverbial Theory

Chapter:
(p.125) 3 The Nature of Experiential Intentionality
Source:
The Sources of Intentionality
Author(s):

Uriah Kriegel

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.003.0003

This chapter develops a separate promising account of experiential intentionality, as free of any tracking-based relations. This is the adverbial theory of experiential intentionality. After laying out some relevant background (Section 3.1), two arguments against tracking-based accounts of experiential intentionality—including higher-order tracking theories—are considered (Sections 3.2–3.3). The main considerations behind them is then used as a launching pad for an alternative adverbial account (Section 3.4). Finally, certain objections are discussed, including one genuinely damaging objection (Section 3.5). The conclusion compares the relative merits and demerits of this account and the higher-order tracking theory.

Keywords:   experiential intentionality, intensionality, intentional inexistence, intentional indifference, tracking, adverbialism

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