The Nature of Experiential Intentionality
The Nature of Experiential Intentionality
II. An Adverbial Theory
This chapter develops a separate promising account of experiential intentionality, as free of any tracking-based relations. This is the adverbial theory of experiential intentionality. After laying out some relevant background (Section 3.1), two arguments against tracking-based accounts of experiential intentionality—including higher-order tracking theories—are considered (Sections 3.2–3.3). The main considerations behind them is then used as a launching pad for an alternative adverbial account (Section 3.4). Finally, certain objections are discussed, including one genuinely damaging objection (Section 3.5). The conclusion compares the relative merits and demerits of this account and the higher-order tracking theory.
Keywords: experiential intentionality, intensionality, intentional inexistence, intentional indifference, tracking, adverbialism
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