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Introspection and Consciousness$
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Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199744794

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 06 December 2021

Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology

Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology

(p.381) 14 Mind-Independence and Visual Phenomenology
Introspection and Consciousness

Maja Spener

Oxford University Press

Many philosophers claim that ordinary visual experience is as of mind-independent things. This is a claim about the phenomenal character of experience. It tends to be regarded as a simple introspective datum and as such plays a key evidential role in a central way of theorizing about experience. The chapter argues that due to worries arising from introspective disagreement, philosophers employing this putative bit of introspective evidence face the challenge of saying how apparent mind-independence can be an introspectible part of phenomenal character. The chapter explores the idea of extracting apparent mind-independence from other, straightforwardly introspectively available, apparent properties and consider three specific extraction proposals. In each case, it argues that the extraction of apparent mind-independence from the relevant basic apparent properties does not convincingly answer the challenge. It is doubtful that apparent mind-independence of what is presented in experience is a simple introspective datum. This means we have to reconsider its status as introspective evidence in theorizing about experience.

Keywords:   visual experience, phenomenal character, perception, introspection, methodology, spatial character, perceptual constancies, introspective disagreement

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